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NOTES
AGREEMENT NOT TO COMPETE - TAX CONSEQUENCES
By
EARL KAPLAN*
In the law of contracts there are many aspects which may prove advantageous
to one party to the agreement and disadvantageous to the other. The effect of
the federal income tax on the parties to a contract is a major problem. In particu-
lar, one of these conflicting problems is the tax consequences of an agreement not
to compete. Much of the conflict stems from the dose relationship of such an
agreement with good will.
The following is a fact pattern of two recent cases which involved the same
contract.'
The sellers owned the entire capital stock in a newspaper publish-
ing business. Some of the sellers were actually connected with he news-
paper business while others were investors in the business only. All the
stockholders got together and sold all their stock to the purchasers.
There was good will in the business. The purchasers well experienced
taxwise in this type of sale were able to get the sellers to add a covenant
not to compete in a separate clause of the contract and allocate a certain
portion of the sales price to that covenant. The agreed sales price of
the stock was allocated, to wit, $150.00 for each share of stock and
$50.00 for the covenant not to compete.
The question presented was whether the allocation on the face of the con-
tract should be upheld. If the allocation were upheld the $50 allocated to the
covenant would be ordinary income to the seller. The buyer, on the other hand,
would be allowed to amortize the amount paid for the covenant over the years the
covenant not to compete was to run.
In the Hamlin Trust case 2 the Commissioner taxed the selling stockholders
on the portion of the purchase price allocated to the covenant not to compete as
ordinary income to them. Then the Commissioner took a contrary position in the
Gazette Telegraph Co. case' contending that the purchasing stockholders paid the
entire purchase price for the stock and nothing for the covenant and so were not
entitled to amortize the amount claimed to have been paid for the covenant. Judge
Tietjens who gave the opinion in both cases brings out the fact that the taking
of inconsistent positions by the Commissioner is not an unusual situation since
the Commissioner often does this in order to protect the revenues.4
* LL.B. Dickinson School of Law, LL.M., Taxation, New York University Law School.
1 Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust, 19 T.C. -, No. 88 (1953), taxpayer was the seller of the
covenant not to compete; Gazette Telegraph Co., 19 T.C. -, No. 86 (1953), taxpayer was
the purchaser of said covenant.
2 See n. I supra.
8 See n. 1 supra.
4 Hamlin Trust, see n. 1 supra, first paragraph of opinion. .
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The holdings in both cases were consistent. In the Hamlin Trust case the
sellers, whether connected with newspaper activities or not, were chargeable with
ordinary income as to that portion allocated to the covenant not to compete. In
the Gazette Telegraph Co. case the court did not agree with the Commissioner's
contention that the covenant was nonseverable from the good will and held in-
stead that it was subject to depreciation, allowing the purchasers to amortize that
portion paid for the covenant.
These two cases bring out the basic tax conflict of the seller and the buyer
of an agreement not to compete. The seller wishes to have a capital gain by show-
ing either that (1) the covenant is part of the good will itself, or (2) he will
try to show by extrinsic evidence that the covenant was either valueless or given a
disproportionate value. This latter argument can b'e proven by showing that the
parties never intended that the covenant was to have a value or that there was
not an arm's length transaction.6 The buyer, on the other hand, tries to show the
severability of the covenant from the good will so that he may depreciate the
cost to him for the period the covenant is to run.8
Good will is a capital asset.7 The sellers' first argument in Hamlin Trust
was based on the fact that the covenant not to compete was part of the good will.
This was done in order to prove that all the money received for their stock was a
capital gain and none was receivable for the covenant. This is another way of say-
ing that the covenant was inseparable from the good will and thus capital gain
resulted.8 Distinguishing between good will and a covenant not to compete is a
question of fact.9
In the Toledo Newspaper case 10 it was said that the agreement not to com-
pete was necessary in order to prevent the sellers from destroying the value of the
good will of the business transferred. Why then in Hamlin Trust was not the
agreement inseparable from the good will and also a capital gain? The majority
opinion distinguishes the Toledo Newspaper case in that here the sellers were not
selling a going business together with the good will in which the covenant not to
5 Part I infra which discusses these arguments deals only with cases in which the seller was
the taxpayer involved.
6 Part II infra which discusses the buyer's contentions deals only with cases in which the buyer
was the taxpayer.
7 Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-10; Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949). Contra: Williams v. McGowan,
152 F.2d 570 (C.C.A. 2d; 1945).
8 Toledo Newspaper Co., 2 T.C. 794 (1943), in the sale of a going business together with good
will, the court held that the agreement not to compete for 10 years had the function primarily of
assuring to the purchaser the beneficial enjoyment of the good will he had acquired and thus
was regarded as nonseverable, being in effect a contributing element to the asset transferred and
hence gain was capital. Aaron Michaels, See n. 7 supra, held that the agreement not to compete
was ancillary to the transfer of good will.
9 The following cases held that good will was sold: Rainier Brewing Co., 7 T.C. 162 (1946),
aff'd 165 F.2d 217 (C.C.A. 9th 1948), rehearing denied 166 F.2d 324 (C.C.A. 9th 1948); Rich-
ard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950) ; Lester T. Cox v. U.S., 99 F. Supp. 518 (D.C. Ariz. 1951);
Ethyl M. Cox, 17 T.C. 1287 (1952); Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949) where under the
facts a 50/50 allocation was made.
If) See n. 8 supra.
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compete might have been regarded as nonseverable, but were only selling their
stock in the newspaper." As the cases indicate, this distinction is a valid one to
make. 12 It is also stated in the regulations' 3 that good will must be accompanied
by a transfer of the assets, i.e., a transfer of the business or a part of the business
to which good will attaches. 14 The sellers have no good will to transfer unless the
corporate veil is pierced. The sellers are merely selling their stock while in the
Toledo Newspaper case they are selling a going business to which good will attaches.
In Cox v. Helvering,15 however, there was a sale of a going business but the
covenant was held to be ordinary income. This case was distinguished by the To-
ledo Newspaper case' 6 in the following manner: Good will will not attach if
(a) the promise not to compete was unrelated to any sale made by the promisor
and (b) the promise not to compete does not operate as a restraint upon any
property of the promisor and is not, therefore, an inherent part of anything sold
by the promisor.
Another reason why the agreement not to compete may be inseparable from
good will is by the application of an equitable principle which is the local law of
some jurisdictions and which would greatly cut down the value of the covenant.17
This rule of equity is that the sale of good will in a business carries with it an
implied covenant by the seller that he will not solicit his old customers nor do any
act which would interfere with buyer's use and enjoyment of what he has pur-
chased. The application of this rule would give little significance to the covenant
not to compete and the covenant would appear to merge with the good will since
the covenant is already implied with the sale of the business.
If the agreement is a separate item, i.e., consideration is paid primarily for
the agreement not to compete, ordinary income results. 18 The seller tried to dis-
prove by extrinsic facts, in Hamlin, that the consideration was paid primarily for
the agreement by showing that all the money received was for the stock and none
was for the agreement not to compete. The seller also argued that he was unaware
of the tax consequences to him and thus it was not an arm's length deal. In answer
to the latter argument the court said that it made no difference that the seller did
11 See n. 4 supra, sixth paragraph of opinion.
12 George Prince, 42,238 P-H Memo B.T.A., where the amount received to refrain from com-
petition was ordinary income and not allocable to good will since neither the business nor the
assets of the ferry company were sold. Similarly: Cox v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 987, (C.C.A. D.C.
1931) the amount paid to the shareholder for his agreement not to compete was ordinary income
since the sale of business was made by the corporation and not the promisor.
18 Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-10.
14 Stratton Grocery Co., 8 B.T.A. 317 (1927), sale of the assets includes good will; but see
Akers, 6 T.C. 693 (1946) where there is no good will in the assets if embodied in a franchise
which was not subject to transfer or other disposition.
15 See n. 12 supra; note that the promisor of the covenant was not the seller of the going business.
16 See n. 8 supra, at p. 805-806.
17 Rainier Brewing Co., see n. 9 supra.
1 Cox v. Helvering, see n. 12 supra: Salvage v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112 (C.C.A.2d 1935),
aff'd, sub. nom. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U.S. 106 (1936); John D. Beals' Estate, 82 F.2d 268
(C.C.A.2d 1936), aff'd 31 B.T.A. 966 (1934); Estate of Mildred K. Hyde, 42 B.T.A. 738 (1940).
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not fully appreciate the significance taxwise of what he was doing, since the buy-
er was fully aware of what the consequences to him might be and thus put the seller
on notice that tax problems were involved. As to the seller's argument that no value
could be placed on the covenant the court in their opinion puts great weight on the
fact that the written contract treated the covenant as a separate item. The court
said simply that if the allocation given to the covenant were not upheld the clause
so allocating would be rendered meaningless.
A strong dissent appears in the Hamlin Trust case. Judge Johnson, the trier
of the facts, wrote the opinion for tht dissent. The facts as the dissent relates are:
The parties never intended that the covenant was to have any significance. All
during the negotiations the only price discussed was the overall price and the only
time a separate value appeared was in the addition of the clause in the contract
making the allocation. The evidence showed that the real market value of the stock
was over the allocated price of $150.00. The agreement not to compete was out of
proportion to any value possessed by the noncompetitive agreement of the sell-
eis. Those stockholders who never had anything to do with the business certainly
could not place any value on their agreement. Only Nowels, the president of the
corporation and editor of the newspaper, had the necessary experience which might
cause him to compete but the buyers had employed Nowels by written contract to
work for them even before the consummation of the sale.
In spite of the above facts the majority of the court stresses form over the
substance and gives the utmost consideration to the allocation fixed Sy the parties.
There has been a recent memorandum decision, however, which supports the
dissent.19 The majority court quoting from the Rodney B. Horton case2 0 indi-
cates that even in the sale of a going business if the covenant can be segregated
there will be ordinary income to the seller. Again this would be a factual question. 21
II
As is brought out in Gazette Telegraph Co. 22 the buyer has the problem of
proving that a deduction for the covenant not to compete is not precluded under
the depreciation regulation.2" Good will has an indeterminate life, therefore it
is not subject to dtpreciation.2 4 A collateral promise not to compete for a stated
number of years does not measure the life of good will if in fact the price was for
good will.25 An agreement not to compete will have an indeterminate life if it is
so tied up with good will as to become an integral part of it, despite the provisions
19 Giulio Particelli, 11 T.C.M. 150 (1952), appeal pending before 9th Circuit; allocation of
price made on the face of the contract was found to be greatly disproportionate in view of the
eviden-ce, whereupon a reallocation was made by the court; the form of the contract was not con-
trolling.
20 13 T.C. 143 (1949).
21 See n. 9 supra.
22 19 T.C. -, No. 86 (1953).
28 Reg. 118, § 39.23(1).3.
24 Ibid.
28 Valdosta Drug Co., 34,131 P-H B.T.A. Memo.
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in the contract to the contrary, and will not be subject to depreciation. 26 The con-
tract involved in the Toledo Blade case 27 was the same as in Toledo Newspaper
Co.2 8 The purchasers in Toledo Blade were not allowed depreciation deduction
for the cost of the covenant. A specific amount was put on the covenant and on
the other intangibles such as the trade name, circulation route, subscription lists
and others. The covenant accompanied the transfer of good will in the sale of
a going concern. It was held that the covenant was essentially to assure the pur-
chasers the beneficial enjoyment of the good will. In a sense the covenant not to
compete was really good will under a different name. Therefore, the sale of
good will and the covenant were indivisible.29 The implied covenant not to compete
theory is also applicable here to cut down the value of the covenant.8 0
At first glance the case of B. T. Babbitt, Inc.3 1 appears as contrary to the rule
set down by Toledo Blade. The court in Babbitt allocated a lump sum payment in
tht- sale of a going business where the value of the covenant not to compete was
capable of being proved. The explanation of this divergence is that the court
found that Babbitt's object in entering into the contracts was primarily to elimi-
nate competition, i.e., good will was not an important part of the business acquired.
The distinction, therefore, boils down to whether the forbearance from com-
petition is good will itself, depreciation not being allowed, and conversely de-
preciation will be allowed if the restraint on competition is in fact something other
than the good will of the business.
Th' buyer in Gazette Telegraph did not have the problem presented in the
Toledo Blade case since there was no sale of a going business to which good will
could attach. The buyer does have the problem of showing that the agreement
not to compete m'eets certain qualifications. Consideration paid for an agreement
not to compete is itself a capital outlay. 82 If the terms of the agreement are indefi-
nite there can be no deduction.88 There is no depreciation deduction if there is
a failure to prove the value of the agreement in the contract price,8 4 nor is there
26 Toledo Blade, 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd without opinion in 180 F.2d 357 (C.C.A. 6th),
cert. denied 340 U.S. 811.
27 Ibid.
28 See n. 8 supra.
29 Similarly: Harold Burke, 18 T.C. 17 (1952); R. Bryson Jones, 17 B.T.A. 1213 (1929).
80 See text on p. 4 supra, first paragraph.
81 32 B.T.A. 693 (1935).
82 All the cases in Part II are authority for the statement. In particular, see L. M. Brown, 1 T.C.M.
509 (1943).
88 Market Supply Co., 3 B.T.A. 841 (1926); Press Publishing Co., 17 B.T.A. 152 (1929); Clark
Thread Co., 23 B.T.A. 1128 (1933), aff'd 100 F.2d 257 (C.C.A. 3rd 1938); Salinas Valley Ice
Co., Ltd., 1 T.C.M. 84 (1942); L. M. Brown, see n. 32 supra.
84 Boonville National Bank, 2 B.T.A. 352 (1925), (the court erred in holding that the differ-
ence between book value of the stock and the price paid represented good will. The right result
was reached, however, in that the value of the covenant could not be proven and all gain was
capital.); General Equipment Co., 2 B.T.A. 804 (1925); J. I. Case Co., 32 F. Supp. 754 (Ct. Cls.
1940),
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a deduction if the money is shown to be paid primarily as a down payment on the
purchase price and not allocated to the agreement not to compete. 86
The cases are clear that if there is no sale of the business, good will not at-
taching, and the consideration paid is primarily for the agreement, depreciation
over the period of the agreement not to compete is allowable.86 In allowing the
buyer to depreciate the agreement the court in Gazette Telegraph does not cite
any of the cases cited in footnote 36 in support of their conclusion. But the court
does make certain statements8 7 which follow the rationale of those cases.
The court in Gazette Telegraph strongly states: s8
"The nub of the question is whether the agreement not to compete
was actually dealt with as a separate item in the transaction, and, if so,
how much was paid for it." Citing: Aaron Michaelss9 and Rodney B.
Horton40.
The above statement of the court shows its approval to a depreciation de-
duction where consideration for the agreement is stated separately even though
the agreement is made in connection with the sale of a going business. 4" The To-
ledo cases would indicate a contrary result if the covenant was an integral part of
the good will, i.e., the acquisition of the good will being the main objective.
Once it is determined that the seller has ordinary income it would seem to
follow that the purchaser should be able to deduct his expense under I.R.C. Sec.
2 3(a) (1) (A), as an ordinary and necessary business expense. The courts, however,
treat the proceeds of a covenant not to compete as a valuable asset of a capital nature
and not as an ordinary deduction.' 2 The only time the courts discuss both the ordi-
nary and necessary business deduction and the depreciation deduction as a possi-
bility is when the contract expressly provides for specific payments to be made
over a period of time. In such a situation, once the deduction is determined the
85 A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 31 B.T.A. 386 (1934); Frank L. Neuburger, 13 T.C. 232 (1949);
Similarly: City Ice Delivery Co. v. U.S., 82 F. Supp. 490 (D.C. N.C. 1948), aff'd 176 F.2d 347
(C.C.A. 4th 1949).
86 Farmers' Feed Co. of N.Y., 17 B.T.A. 507 (1929); Christensen Machine Co., 18 B.T.A. 256
(1929); Black River Sand Corp., 18 B.T.A. 490 (1929); News Leader Co., 18 B.T.A. 1212
(1930); Eitingon-Schild Co., 21 B.T.A. 1163 (1931); Eagle Pass & Piedras Negras Bridge Co.,
23 B.T.A. 1338 (1931); J. S. L. Restaurants, Inc., 10 T.C.M. 180 (1951).
87 See n. 22 supra, fourth paragraph of opinion.
ss See n. 22 supra, second paragraph of opinion.
89 See n. 7 supra. Michaels followed the Toledo cases but the opinion brought out the fact that
if the agreement could be segregated, indicating a separate item, then the agreement is ordinary
income.
40 See n. 20 supra. The Horton case by its facts indicated a segregation, i.e., the court probably
put weight on the clause which stated that if Horton ceased to reside in New Mexico or died, the
percentage should be reduced by 50% in holding that 50% of the 6 year agreement was ordinary
income.
41 Similarly: Carboloy Co., Inc., 2 T.C.M. 413 (1943).
42 Appeal of the Record Abstract Co., 2 B.T.A. 638 (1925); News Leader Co., see n. 36 supra;
Eagle Pass & Piedras Negras Bridge Co., see n. 36 supra; Newspaper Printing Co., 17 B.T.A.
.452 (1929), aff'd 56 F.2d 125 (C.C.A.3d 1932),; Clark Thread Co., see n. 33 supra; J. I. Case
Co., see n. 34 supra; Salinas Valley Ice Co., LTD., see n. 33 supra; L. M. Brown, see n. 32 supra.
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court will allow it either under I.R.C. Sec. 23(a) (1)(A) or Sec. 23(1) since
the result will be the same.4
8
Conclasion
It is to the seller's advantage to allocate as much as possible to good will, a
capital asset. This can be done if he sells a going business or assets to which good
will can attach. If the asset to which the good will attaches has been held for more
than six months, the gain attributable to it by virtue of a sale will be a long term
capital gain.
The purchaser in order to get a tax saving in the way of a depreciation de-
duction should place a separate value on the covenant and have the covenant run
for a definite period of time. Recent tax court decisions seem to indicate that ut-
most consideration will be given to the allocation fixed by the parties to the con-
tract. If the covenant is tied up with the sale of a going business there is a risk to
the buyer that the covenant will be considered nonseverable from the good will
and nondepreciable.
Finally, if stock is sold along with the covenant an allocation will be made
unless there is strong evidence that the covenant is valueless or has a value highly
out of proportion to any value assigned to the covenant.4' If the value is highly
disproportionate the court will allocate what they consider to be a proper amount.
Obviously, an allocation cannot be made to please both the buyer and the
seller; but armed with this knowledge, either party can bargain for better terms
elsewhere in the contract of sale. If no specific valuation is made, the Commissioner
is apt to make his own allocation depending upon which of the parties is before him.
48 Eitingon-Schild Co., see n. 36 supra; Carboloy Co., Inc., see n. 41 supra.
44 Boonville National Bank, 2 B.T.A. 354.
